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Abstract
Public and private organizations are increasingly applying behavioral economics methods to a variety of issues
such as mechanism design and incentive architecture. However, there has been little focus on how experimental
tools used in behavioral economics can help companies learn more about their (current or prospective) workforce
and, more specifically, about their employees’ tastes and inclinations. This has important implications for
broader organizational performance since some designs/incentives are likely to affect only individuals with a
particular disposition (e.g. risk averse or fairness oriented) but not others, or can even have opposite effects on
individuals with different sets of preferences. In this commentary, we point out a number of promising avenues
for the application of a behavioral economics lens to understand and manage people within organizations. A
comprehensive case study is also provided.
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Introduction
Behavioral economics refers to the integration of psychologi-
cal and social insights into economic analysis. This informal
(and deliberately rough) definition underscores the potential
of such an approach for the understanding of organizational
performance. Given that organizations are basically groups
of interdependent people, it follows that people’s psychology
and social concerns are key elements in the functioning of
organizations.
In the last years, both public and private companies have
shown an increasing interest in the application of behavioral
insights to several areas of the business, such as the design of
choice and incentive architecture (e.g. Thaler and Benartzi
(2004), Thaler and Sunstein (2008), Goldstein et al. (2008),
Ariely (2009)); the results appear to be promising1. Many be-
havioral economics prescriptions for organizations (as well as
for public policy) are based on previous scientific knowledge
regarding the limits of human greed, willpower and rational
calculation (Camerer and Malmendier 2007), which entails,
for instance, that the way in which options are presented may
influence choices and that revealed preferences often do not
coincide with normative preferences (e.g. Thaler and Sun-
stein (2008), Ariely (2009), Kooreman and Prast (2010), Frey
(2017), Sunstein (2017)).
1 Gallup research shows that “a study group of 10 companies that applied
these principles outperformed peers by 85% in sales growth and more than
25% in gross margin during a recent one-year period” Fleming & Harter
(2009).
These organizational applications are typically carried
out under the assumption of homogeneous agents. To put it
differently, behavioral applications are generally thought for
an “average”, representative individual. For instance, since
behavioral research shows that people display inconsistent
(i.e. present biased) intertemporal preferences, allowing em-
ployees to base their pension schemes on pre-commitment
devices can increase savings (Thaler and Benartzi 2004) and,
as a consequence, long-term organizational efficiency (Lazear
1979). Also, since people have prosocial preferences, piece-
rate incentives may lead to higher productivity than relative-
performance incentives because the latter impose negative
externalities on peers (Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 2005).
However, not all individuals display present bias or social
concerns, at least, not to the same extent or in the same way.
Indeed, one key lesson from behavioral experiments is that
people are highly heterogeneous (e.g. Holt and Laury (2002),
Corgnet et al., (2015), Charness and Rabin (2002), Frederick
et al. (2002), Fischbacher et al. (2001)). This means that,
as happens with more “traditional” personnel economics pre-
scriptions (Lazear and Shaw 2007), some behavioral solutions
are likely to have a positive effect on the performance of em-
ployees with a particular thinking style or set of preferences
but can be innocuous or even overtly harmful for individuals
with different dispositions.
More specifically, extrinsic motivations (e.g. monetary
or award incentives) may either crowd-in or crowd-out the
employees’ intrinsic motivations depending on their tastes
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and dispositions (Gagne´ and Deci 2005, Burks, Carpenter,
and Goette 2009, Frey 2017, Falk and Kosfeld 2006). Under-
standing when and why certain interventions can be effective
thus requires understanding the psychology of employees at
the individual level. For instance, extrinsic incentives linked
to team performance, which align personal and group bene-
fits and are thus thought to increase overall team productivity,
might increase the cooperativeness of relatively self-interested
individuals but, at the same time, be counterproductive for
intrinsically cooperative employees who cooperate with their
peers without any need of external enforcement. This means
that this type of incentives should probably not be used in
groups of (previously identified) cooperative individuals. In
the section “Practical applications of basic insights”, we pro-
vide a number of similar examples.
The next two sections are devoted to general ideas about
the application of experimental techniques used in behav-
ioral economics to measure characteristics of the workforce.
In the last two sections, respectively, we provide practical
(hypothetical) examples of possible solutions to basic prob-
lems and a comprehensive case study showing how behavioral
economics measures can contribute to understand issues in
different areas of the business. For the case study, we offer
a brief summary of the assessment procedures proposed in
the project. However, we are not allowed to show the specific
results and recommendations. In addition, the text has been
anonymized to preserve the identity of all parties involved.
We chose this case study because it touches off a considerable
number of topics for the application of behavioral economics
measures to human resource (HR) management.
Predicting performance, what is being
done?
The measurement of employees’ attitudes in a systematic and
theory-based manner is fundamental to be able to predict their
job performance. This is not new for companies’ managers,
especially in the domain of HR management, where assess-
ments of people are ubiquitous. Many HR departments have
now methods to measure the cognitive abilities (e.g. fluid,
numerical or verbal intelligence) of their companies’ workers
(Schmidt and Hunter 2004). More recently, employees’ non-
cognitive attributes (often referred to as “soft skills”), such
as “Big-Five” personality traits, are also being increasingly
assessed, especially for top level jobs in large firms (Sackett
and Walmsley 2014). Not in vain, cognitive skills and per-
sonality traits have been extensively validated as predictors of
job performance (Sackett and Walmsley 2014, Schmidt and
Hunter 2004).
The most common practice in firms using this type of
assessments is to gather key performance indicators (KPIs) of
their workers and see how the assessed individual variables
correlate with those KPIs. This serves to place, or hire, the
“correct” persons (i.e. those displaying the characteristics that
better predict performance) in the correct positions. Other
common practices are to hire only people that “fit” the com-
pany or the boss, in the sense of having similar attributes
(Sackett and Walmsley 2014). In this commentary, we make
a case for experimental tools used in behavioral economics
to complement these extensively-used measurements of peo-
ple’s attitudes within organizations 2. We consider that such
an approach, while sharing some of the inherent limitations
of workers’ assessments (e.g. how to encourage employees
to participate, self-selection issues, etc.), offers a number of
advantages that deserve exploration.
Nowadays it is possible, for instance, to systematically
assess the intertemporal, risk and social preferences of a large
number of individuals quite easily, while also keeping a rela-
tively high level of control over external confounding factors.
Applying these procedures within companies allows managers
to classify people into categories such as short-run/long-run
oriented, risk averse/seeker, loss averse, cooperative or egal-
itarian. Being able to classify people is a value in itself for
companies and these measures can be used in a similar fashion
as more traditional ones – i.e., to predict performance, to hire
persons who fit the team or the boss, etc.
Moreover, these classifications are based on measures
(typically given by numerical values) which are fairly com-
parable across individuals. Instead of asking someone how
forward looking or risk seeking she is, behavioral measures
rely on real decisions that reveal the decision maker’s true
preferences. Even if we abstract from the obvious influence
that factors such as socially-desirable responding and self-
misrepresentation may exert on self-reported measures 3, the
interpersonal comparability of such measures is also compro-
mised by the subjective perception of respondents about what
levels of a particular personal attribute can be considered low,
medium or high. Peer assessments are not free of these biases
either. Behavioral measures, on the other hand, are able to
provide economically meaningful values (or ranges of values)
based on formal models. For example, the annual subjective
discount factor of worker A has been estimated to be between
0.94 and 0.95, whereas for worker B it is estimated to be in
the 0.97-0.98 range. The discount factor is a measure of the
relative importance the individual gives to later versus sooner
rewards and is therefore economically meaningful and inter-
personally comparable. In the case of the example, we can
infer that worker B is more patient or long-run oriented than
worker A (more precisely, she values rewards that will be re-
ceived one year later 2-4% more than worker A). This means
that worker A and worker B could differ in their response to a
particular incentive scheme if the associated rewards/penalties
are sufficiently delayed: therefore, worker A should be of-
fered incentives with shorter realization times in order to reach
2 For reviews and discussions on the relationship of behavioral eco-
nomics measures with cognitive and non-cognitive personality measures,
see Borghans et al. (2008), Almlund et al. (2011), and Becker et al. (2012)
3 Please note that behavioral measures based on choices with real con-
sequences reduce these biases with respect to traditional techniques such as
surveys or personality self-reports but cannot completely avoid them. This
is particularly important in the context of organizations given that responses
can be observed by managers and this might affect the employees’ choices.
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the same motivation level as worker B (the exact preference
values obtained offer valuable quantitative information that
can be used to calibrate the appropriate incentives for each
worker). Similarly applies to other behavioral economics mea-
sures such as those assessing risk or social preferences. Please
see the section “Practical applications of basic insights” for
potential practical uses of the information obtained.
Measurement and its robustness
In the typical tasks/games of behavioral economics experi-
ments, the individual is asked to make decisions over different
outcomes involving real monetary stakes. For instance, to
elicit someone’s discount factor, the individual typically faces
a series of decision problems of the form, “do you prefer re-
ceiving $100 today or $104 in month? The option you choose
will be implemented for real and you will receive the money
(at the particular date) specified in it”. The advantages of
monetary stakes compared to other types of experimental re-
wards have been discussed in depth and are nowadays broadly
accepted (see Camerer and Hogarth (1999) and Read (2005),
for meaningful discussions). Real monetary incentives are of
course costly to implement but there are ways in which one
can get a good cost-benefit balance, for instance, through the
use of probabilistic rewards (e.g. Exadaktylos et al. (2013)).
In addition, technology makes it now possible to pay partic-
ipants using mobile phone apps that protect personal data,
which simplifies the procedure. It is true, however, that the
use of real monetary incentives in some assessment projects
can be problematic, especially in those involving hiring new
employees.
Also, in the context of real organizations, experimental
tasks/games must be easy but meaningful with the objective
of minimizing complexity while maximizing the quality of
the information gathered. There are several reasons why as-
sessments should not be very long. These include preserving
respondents’ engagement in the task (too long/complex tasks
might be boring and exhausting) and avoiding contamination
between participants if the assessment length requires a break
during which participants can communicate to each other.
Two fundamental concepts here are “validity” and “reli-
ability”. It is true that the validity of behavioral economics
measures to explain behavior and performance in the work-
place needs yet to be evaluated more deeply. Although there is
increasing interest, research addressing the capacity of these
measures to predict job behaviors and performance is still in
its infancy. Since in contrast to cognitive ability and personal-
ity measures (e.g. Sackett and Walmsley (2014), Schmidt and
Hunter (2004)), there is a lack of meta-analytical evidence
of the validity of behavioral measures in the world of work,
predictions often have to be built on individual studies. A
number of independent studies have indeed found evidence of
the predictive validity of intertemporal, risk and social pref-
erences measures in this context (Barr and Serneels (2009),
Carpenter and Seki (2011), Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011), Burks
et al. (2012, 2016), Leibbrandt (2012), Fouarge et al. (2014),
Fiala (2015), Bodnaruk and Simonov (2016)).
Similarly applies to the stability of the measurements
(i.e. their reliability). Although the tastes elicited through
behavioral methods are not conceptually different from other
more “standard” types of tastes (i.e. for a particular food,
sport, car, etc.), it is important to enhance our understand-
ing about the temporal stability of these measurements. The
stability of intertemporal and risk preference measures has
received considerable interest, with evidence suggesting that
they display medium-to-high reliability and test-retest corre-
lations in the range typically observed for personality traits
(e.g. Kirby (2009), Harrison and Mckay (2012), Wo¨lbert and
Riedl (2013), Beauchamp et al. (2015)). Nevertheless, while
a number of studies analyzing the stability of other measures
such as social preferences have yielded similar (positive) find-
ings (e.g. Murphy et al. (2011), Falk et al. (2016)), further
research is clearly needed here.
Practical applications of basic insights
One key application of the information obtained with the
mentioned experimental tools is to compare the characteristics
of different groups. It is of great interest to know which are
the variables that distinguish, for example, consulting from
financial sector workers, one’s own workforce from that of
competing companies, or people at top management levels
from people at secondary management levels 4. Depending on
the circumstances, a company could want to hire the types of
employees which are, or are not, in its standard workforce (as
compared to competing companies for instance) or reassign
people between departments in order to reach the desired
combination of types.
At a more individual level, let us put an example of how
simple measurements can help managers design appropriate
incentives. In a group of 20 salesmen, a new compensation
scheme has been implemented but the results are not as good
as expected and some workers even decreased their sales
after its implementation. The novel incentive consists of a
e200 reward for the worker with the top sales in the last
month. A correlational analysis between the productivity
change (i.e. sales after minus sales before the implementation,
which represents here the KPI under scrutiny) and the assessed
measures of time, risk and social preferences can result in the
following outcomes, which allow to understand the reasons
for the unsatisfactory results and, therefore, intervene:
• Is the incentive too delayed? If the individuals with
worse KPI values are those displaying more short-run
orientation, the incentive can be changed from monthly
to weekly realization (e.g. e50 for the one with top
sales in the last week).
4 These differences arise, at least in part, due to self-selection of people
into occupations or sectors. Self-selection (that can compromise the validity
of particular findings; see Exadaktylos et al. (2013)) can in this way be taken
advantage of.
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• Is the incentive too volatile? If the individuals with
worse KPI values are those displaying more risk aver-
sion, the probability of someone getting the incentive
can be increased (e.g. e20 to the 10 workers with top
monthly sales).
• Is the incentive too unequal? If the individuals with
worse KPI values are those displaying more inequality
aversion, the incentive can be made more equitable (e.g.
e10 for every worker if the sales exceed last month’s
sales).
Case study: Firm A
Firm A is a consulting company with about 500 employees.
The managers of Firm A want to understand the drivers of
information flows between departments. They have identified
dysfunctions in the relationship between a number of depart-
ments since critical information (about practices, protocols
and projects) often does not flow as it should from one to
another. When individuals belonging to the different depart-
ments are debriefed regarding such cooperation failures, the
answer tends to be that it is the fault of the other department’s
people. For a behavioral economist, this appears to be a prob-
lem of between-group cooperation and intergroup bias (i.e.
the tendency to favor members of one’s own group in detri-
ment of members of other groups). The proposed assessment
thus focused on the relationships between individuals within
and across departments in Firm A.
The planned evaluation consisted of having the employ-
ees participate in an online experiment lasting for about 40
minutes. One out of every ten participants would be randomly
selected to receive the real payment associated with one of
his/her decisions (also randomly chosen) through bank trans-
fer. The expected payoff of the selected employees was nearly
e100. Employees would never learn the decisions made by
other employees (i.e. a single blind procedure).
Note that a random sample of workers is often enough
to obtain reliable evaluations, in particular, when the goal is
to infer which employees’ attributes are able to predict one
or several KPIs. In this case, however, all workers should be
assessed since one of the project main goals is to figure out if
some specific individuals represent information (i.e. coopera-
tion) bottlenecks so that intervention recommendations can
put the focus on them.
Based on previous literature, the key measures to be ob-
tained from the participants are the following: intertemporal
preferences, social networks, social preferences and inter-
group bias. These measures allow to infer characteristics of
the individuals involved, learn about the nature of their rela-
tionships, and therefore help design interventions to reduce
between-group conflict and increase cooperation.
Intertemporal preferences are included in the assessment
because there is evidence that within-group cooperation and
coordination (i.e. group synergy) is higher in groups of
long-run oriented, patient people (Espı´n, Correa, and Ruiz-
Villaverde 2015, Curry, Price, and Price 2008, Al-Ubaydli,
Jones, and Weel 2013). The distribution of types (roughly
speaking, patient vs. impatient individuals) within depart-
ments may, therefore, be a key element of within- and between-
department cooperation (Espı´n, Correa, and Ruiz-Villaverde
2015). Most likely, between-department conflict imposes
long-term costs on the employees involved. Thus their in-
tertemporal preferences may partially explain their conflict
behavior5. We refer to the section “Measurement and its ro-
bustness” for an example of decision in typical intertemporal
choice tasks.
To elicit the social networks of employees in Firm A, the
proposed assessment included four standard questions (see
Bran˜as-Garza et al. (2017) for a review of methods). In par-
ticular, the employees would be asked to select, from a drop-
down list, a number of other employees with whom they (i)
prefer to jointly carry out some teamwork, (ii) prefer to jointly
participate in a leisure/socialization activity organized by the
company, (iii) prefer not to jointly carry out some teamwork,
(iv) prefer not to jointly participate in a leisure/socialization
activity organized by the company. The names in the list
correspond to all other participants (both from one’s own and
other departments). The first two questions are intended to
elicit positive relationships, whereas the last two questions
assess negative relationships. Positive and negative relation-
ships in social networks have been found to be key predictors
of between-department conflicts within companies (Labianca,
Brass, and Gray 1998, Nelson 1989, Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne,
and Kraimer 2001). It is important to note that monetary in-
centives for network elicitation (Branas-Garza, Jime´nez, and
Ponti 2017) are not necessary in this case because employees
face other type of extrinsic incentives to reveal their truly
preferred partners (e.g. giving incorrect names could result in
having to work or to go out for dinner with disliked partners)6.
With these data, measures of centrality of individuals
and other aggregate measures can be obtained. In particular,
betweenness, in-degree and closeness centrality individual
measures are key variables here since, among other things,
they can help infer who might serve as a (positive) link be-
tween departments and who is likely to be a bottleneck. One
potential application of these measures is to find out the appro-
priate person(s) to lead the communication between depart-
ments: for example, someone with a central position in the
path between departments (betweeness) can canalize all the
between-department communication7. The density/cohesion
5Experimental evidence from Espı´n et al. (2012) also suggests that in-
tertemporal preferences have to do with the willingness to punish uncoop-
erative group members, which is a fundamental driving force of long-term
cooperation (Ga¨chter, Renner, and Sefton 2008)
6Yet, as noted by a reviewer, there might exist other causes that lead a
worker to hide social network information (for instance, showing a preference
for not working with someone could reflect a non-cooperative character which
might be disliked by the company).
7Although we provide brief practical implications here for several individ-
ual variables, we should note that individual measures are not enough to offer
a definite solution to a problem such as this one and a more complete picture
should be drawn from the whole assessment. For instance, if the person with
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and centralization of the departmental clusters are also vari-
ables of interest: are more dense or centralized departments
more, or less, likely to conflict with other departments? The
intervention recommended to improve between-department
cooperation could depend on the answer to this question. For
instance, if the networks of more conflictive departments are
more (less) centralized around particular individuals, one pos-
sible solution may consist of increasing (reducing) the homo-
geneity of groups.
Finally, the assessment included a battery of social pref-
erence games to elicit the participants’ preferences when
matched with (i) other random participants, (ii) random mem-
bers of his/her own department (ingroups), (iii) random mem-
bers of other departments (outgroups). After reading the
general instructions of each game, individuals would have
to make three types of decisions, one for each different type
of partner. Apart from the “general” dispositions measured
through the first matching protocol, with this methodology it
is possible to explore the level of an individual’s intergroup
bias by comparing his/her decisions in the three cases (Chen
and Li 2009, Espı´n, Correa, and Ruiz-Villaverde 2015). But
even more critically, it also allows to infer how the differ-
ent departments (as aggregate units) are perceived by people
from other departments. The key question here is, which are
the characteristics that define the best-perceived employees
or departments? For example, are they more cooperative,
more trustful, more compassionate, less ingroup biased? The
answer to this question will determine the course of action.
The proposed tasks are the following: a distributional pref-
erences game (Corgnet, Espı´n, and Herna´n-Gonza´lez 2015) to
explore pure outcome-based concerns; a public goods game
(Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr 2001) to explore coopera-
tion and conditional cooperation; an stag hunt game (Skyrms
2004) to explore coordination; a trust game (Ermisch, Gam-
betta, Laurie, Siedler, and Noah Uhrig 2009) to explore trust
and trustworthiness; an ultimatum game (Gu¨th, Schmittberger,
and Schwarze 1982) to explore bargaining and fairness orien-
tation; and a dictator game (Forsythe et al. 1994) to explore
generosity.
As is the case here, often there are technical and logistical
limitations to have participants play a game simultaneously.
Thus, those games that require strategic interaction need to be
played using the strategy method (Selten 1967). The strategy
method entails that the participant decides for every possible
contingency of the game (that is, for every possible choice
of the other player). Let us illustrate this with an example.
In the ultimatum game, a proposer suggests a way to split
e200 with a responder. If the responder accepts the offer,
the proposed split is implemented. However, if the responder
rejects the offer, both players earn nothing. Here, all partici-
pants would have to make decisions for both roles of the game
(Exadaktylos, Espı´n, and Bran˜as-Garza 2013). For the role of
good relationships at both sides is also uncooperative according to another
measure, s/he might not be the appropriate person to lead between-department
communication.
the responder, using the strategy method, they would have to
decide in advance whether they accept or reject each of the
possible offers (Mitzkewitz and Nagel 1993).
The dictator game is identical to the ultimatum game with
the exception that the second player is passive, so that the pro-
poser’s (here labeled as “dictator”) offer is implemented for
sure. The simplicity of this game allows to use it, for instance,
to elicit the individuals’ beliefs about the average generosity
of different groups of participants (corresponding to the afore-
mentioned three types of matching) and even to provide the
decision maker with the name of the recipient, which allows
to examine which departments and individuals are seen as less
generous and which ones receive less generosity from others.
The amount of information obtained with this assessment
is indeed exceptional. Both individualized and aggregate anal-
yses can be carried out. Therefore, many variables can enter
the equation (note that variables such as the participant’s gen-
der, age, experience, position, type of contract and earnings
need also to be accounted for and have to be collected ei-
ther during the experiment or from the company’s previous
data). However, this fact may also imply that the statistics
are complex and strong econometric skills might thus be re-
quired. Especially in these cases, it is important to note that,
while exploratory analyses need to be performed, theory- and
evidence-based hypotheses must drive the data analysis.
Conclusion
We have delineated some potential avenues for the use of a
behavioral economics approach for the evaluation and man-
agement of people within organizations, with applications
for both the private and public sector. Hopefully, these lines
stimulate further research on the areas where the evidence is
still scarce.
To the best of our knowledge the supply of behavioral eco-
nomics assessments for companies is very limited. Although
there is increasing demand, the experience so far suggests
that one of the main problems to sell this type of services
(apart from the obvious entry barriers) is that managers, even
within HR departments, are not familiar with the methodology
and are thus reticent to apply it. However, now widely-used
measurements such as cognitive skills and personality traits
also found similar obstacles some years ago. We are thus
optimistic that the current obstacles will decrease in the near
future once more and more companies take the first step in
applying behavioral economics methods to the assessment of
their employees’ attitudes.
Regarding possible policy implications, we can offer sev-
eral insights. Governments might encourage public and pri-
vate employment agencies to assess the characteristics of the
(to be) employees not only in order to facilitate companies to
hire the appropriate workers, but also to help employees to
develop their careers toward the sector or level that is better
suited to their characteristics. Public employment policy may
benefit from these practices.
Another key insight for public policy might be obtained
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from assessing the preferences of the public servants in differ-
ent institutions (e.g. city councils or regional governments)
and analyze which are the variables that distinguish corrupt
from non-corrupt institutions, over-indebted from balanced-
accounting ones, etc. This would help solve these important
problems through a systematic knowledge of their origin.
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